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Hirakis: Post-Arrest Pre-Miranda Silence

YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, AND IT CAN
AND WILL BE USED AGAINST YOU: ADDRESSING POSTARREST PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE
Maria P. Hirakis*
“In most circumstances, silence is so ambiguous that it is of little
probative force.”1
- Justice Thurgood Marshall

ABSTRACT
The right to remain silent has long been recognized by the
Supreme Court as requiring a high degree of protection. Since
Miranda v. Arizona was decided in 1966, procedural safeguards have
been put in place to inform individuals of this right upon arrest. Yet,
a gray area exists when it comes to the use of an individual's silence
post-arrest. It may surprise some that a point in time exists when an
individual has not yet been read their Miranda rights post-arrest.
Several circuit courts have taken the position that any silence that
follows arrest but precedes the reading of Miranda rights can be used
against an individual as evidence of their guilt. The unresolved circuit
split on the issue of post-arrest pre-Miranda silence continues to pose
a threat to one of the most fundamental rights afforded to individuals.
Resolution is not out of the Court's reach. By incorporating existing
precedent and establishing a bright-line rule which would require
formal arrest to immediately trigger Miranda's procedural safeguards,
*
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United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 176 (1975).
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the Court can ensure that the constitutional guarantees which are so
deeply rooted in our justice system may continue to prosper.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are out with some friends, just taking a joy
ride, trying to escape from what seems like a never-ending quarantine
imposed by the Government to offset the global pandemic currently
affecting most parts of the world. While in quarantine, you needed to
find a way to supplement your income due to the job you lost and
became a low-level drug dealer, selling small amounts of marijuana to
your friends and associates. While on this joy ride, you happen to have
a small amount of marijuana, enough to violate the possession laws of
your state. You had no intention of making a sale tonight; you just
wanted to get out of the house and get some fresh air. Regardless of
your intentions, you have been pulled over by undercover narcotics
police.
The arresting officers handcuff you, put you in the back of their
vehicle, and drive you to the police station. The anomaly in this
otherwise typical scenario is that you have not yet been read your
Miranda2 rights, but you know they should be read anytime soon.
Regardless of the delayed reading, you are aware of your rights, so you
choose to remain silent when questioned by the police officers as to
why you were in possession of the marijuana at the time of your arrest.
In your mind, you are exercising your constitutionally protected rights
and cannot suffer any adverse consequences for doing so. However,
in some states, your choice to remain silent can and will be used against
you in a court of law.3
In movies and television shows, such as Law and Order,4 once
an individual has been placed into handcuffs, the reading of those
famous rights is an automatic response by the arresting officers. A
person would think that once they are handcuffed, they are officially
in police custody and are therefore required to be read their rights.5
The problem is, depending on where one lives, officers can willfully
delay these readings and the arrestee’s choice to remain silent can be
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See infra Part IV.
4
Law & Order, Special Victims Unit: Bad Blood (NBC television broadcast Jan. 14,
2000).
5
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either
retained or appointed.”).
3
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used against them as evidence of their guilt. 6 The issue of the use of
post-arrest pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of a
defendant’s guilt has gone unresolved for so long and continues to
cause a rift in our criminal justice system, where uniformity should be
the norm.7 Yet, Federal Circuit Courts across the United States remain
split on the topic, creating the need for resolution by the Supreme Court
now more than ever.8
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the split in
June of 2020 by granting certiorari in Palacios-Solis v. United States. 9
Unfortunately, the Court denied the petition without issuing an
opinion, missing the chance to address the issue of whether a
defendant’s silence after arrest, but before the reading of his Miranda
rights, may be used as substantive evidence of guilt against him. 10 This
Note argues that the Supreme Court erred by not granting certiorari in
Palacios and that this denial will perpetuate the lack of uniformity in
the lower courts on this specific issue. Part II of this Note begins with
the historical background of the right to remain silent and its
underpinnings in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 11 Part III
breaks down the evolution of Miranda rights into three subsections.
The first subsection discusses how the Supreme Court dealt with
silence prior to its holding in Miranda v. Arizona.12 Subsection two
discusses the seminal holding in Miranda. Subsection three discusses
how the Court has defined “custody” and “interrogation” following
Miranda, and explores the Court’s application of Miranda, focusing
on its invocation requirements and their relationship to pre-trial silence
for impeachment purposes, as well as the use of pre-trial silence as
substantive evidence of guilt. 13 This subsection discusses pre-trial
silence and how it may or may not be used as substantive evidence of
a defendant’s guilt. This subsection also explores the circumstances in
which the Court has addressed this issue, specifically pre-arrest pre6

Adam M. Hapner, You Have the Right to Remain Silent, But Anything You Don't
Say May Be Used Against You: The Admissibility of Silence as Evidence After Salinas
v. Texas, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1763, 1776 (2014).
7
See infra Parts III and IV for a discussion on the current circuit split.
8
Matthew J. Thompson Jr., Salinas v. Texas: The Fifth Amendment SelfIncrimination Burden, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 19, 30 (2015).
9
949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020).
10
Palacios-Solis v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 162 (2020).
11
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
12
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13
See infra Part III Sub. A.
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Miranda silence and post-arrest post-Miranda silence. Subsection
three highlights the importance of the Court addressing the unresolved
area of post-arrest pre-Miranda silence, that continues to cause a split
in the lower courts.
Part IV begins the examination of the current circuit split. This
part analyzes decisions of the Fourth, 14 Fifth,15 Eighth,16 and
Eleventh17 Circuit Courts, which held that post-arrest pre-Miranda
silence is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief. Part V continues the circuit split
discussion by presenting cases from the Ninth, 18 Seventh,19 and D.C.20
Circuit Courts which have taken the opposite position, holding that
post-arrest pre-Miranda silence may not be used as substantive
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 21
Part VI argues that the Supreme Court erred in not granting
certiorari in Palacios-Solis.22 The Court’s decision to ignore this
unresolved issue poses a grave threat to a defendant’s right to remain
silent. Currently, lower courts are free to dictate their own evidentiary
rules that may unfairly prejudice a defendant by allowing his postarrest pre-Miranda silence to be used against him as evidence of his
guilt. As this Note demonstrates, Miranda requires that the police
must read the Miranda rights to a person upon arrest. Specifically, that
there should never be a point in time when a defendant is not
immediately read his Miranda rights once he has been placed under
arrest.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Many people know that they have the right to remain silent
during interrogation thanks, in part, to shows like Law and Order,

14

United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985).
United States v. Garcia-Gil, 133 F. App’x 102, 108 (5th Cir. 2005).
16
United States v. Fraizer, 394 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 2002).
17
United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991).
18
United States v. Veldarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2001).
19
United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 323 (7th Cir. 1991).
20
United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
21
See infra Part V.
22
Palacios-Solis, 141 S. Ct. at 162.
15
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Special Victims Unit.23 Popular criminal justice shows have helped
individuals practically regurgitate the Miranda warnings, which has
made the right to remain silent one of the most well-known
constitutionally protected rights we have. 24 Chief Justice Rehnquist
notably said that the Miranda warnings “have become part of our
national culture.”25 However, while the historical holding in Miranda
v. Arizona solidified protections of the right to remain silent, the
Court’s holding was not its origin. 26
A.

The Fifth Amendment

The constitutional underpinnings of the right to remain silent
are seen throughout the Fifth Amendment, which was ratified in the
Bill of Rights in 1791.27 The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .”28 The plain text provides for protection against selfincrimination.29 The need for this protection can be traced back to the
maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, or “no man is bound to accuse
himself.”30 This maxim’s recognition of the need for protections
against self-incrimination stemmed from the “inquisitorial and
manifestly unjust methods” of interrogation employed during the
British rule.31 The founders saw how tempting it could be to harass
witnesses, intimidate them, and force them to confess to crimes they
did not commit during interrogations. 32 The ease in which these
concerns could come to fruition gave “rise to a demand for its total
abolition.”33 These injustices of the English criminal procedure, which

23

Law & Order, Special Victims Unit: Bad Blood (NBC television broadcast January
14, 2000).
24
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436; Meaghan Elizabeth Ryan, Do You Have the Right to
Remain Silent? The Substantive Use of Pre-Miranda Silence, 58 ALA. L. REV. 903,
903 (2007).
25
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
26
384 U.S. 436; Andrew J. M. Bentz, The Original Public Meaning of the Fifth
Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 897, 904 (2012).
27
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596–97 (1896).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
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were “mere rule[s] of evidence, became clothed in this country with
the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.” 34
Though not expressly stated in the text of the Fifth
Amendment, courts have interpreted that the right to remain silent is
indirectly codified within the privilege against self-incrimination.35
The Supreme Court has noted that the Fifth Amendment allows an
individual to refuse to answer an officer’s questions “where those
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” 36
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF MIRANDA
A.

A World Before Miranda

Though Miranda and its warnings protect silence when an
individual is faced with custodial interrogation, it was not the first time
the Supreme Court was presented with an issue involving the right to
remain silent.37 In 1926, the Supreme Court held in Raffel v. United
States 38 that a defendant’s privilege under the Fifth Amendment
against self-incrimination may be waived when the defendant chooses
to take the stand at trial in his own defense. 39 In this case, Raffel was
indicted and tried twice for “conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act.”40 During the first trial, the jury heard testimony from
a prohibition agent who testified that “after the search of a drinking
place, Raffel admitted that the place belonged to him,” implicating him
in an illegal scheme in violation of the Act. 41 Raffel chose not to testify
in his own defense during the first trial, but having already heard the
testimony of the prosecution’s witness, he took the stand during a
second trial where he denied ever making any such admission.42 Raffel
34

Id.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
“guarantees against federal infringement—the right of a person to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will ….”). See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 (“In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is
guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will.).
36
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984).
37
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498 (1926).
38
Id. at 498-99.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 495.
41
Id.
42
Id.
35
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admitted that “he was present at the former trial, and that the same
prosecuting witness had then given the same testimony.”43 This
provoked the court to question Raffel about his silence and refusal to
testify during the first trial, requiring him “to explain why he had not
done so.”44
On a writ of error, the Court was presented with a certification
from the Sixth Circuit to resolve the issue of whether the trial court
erred in requiring Raffel to disclose that he had not testified on his own
behalf during the first trial. 45 The Court held that the Fifth Amendment
protections against self-incrimination may be waived by a defendant
“by offering himself as a witness” and that a defendant’s silence may
be used against him for the “purpose of impeaching his credibility.” 46
The Court reasoned that the accused could not partially waive his right
to remain silent, specifically stating that “having once cast aside the
cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever crossexamination may be inconvenient or embarrassing.”47 Thus, once a
defendant testifies as a witness in his own defense, he waives the
privileges and protections against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment, notwithstanding the fact that he previously invoked the
right.48 The Court inferred that the privilege of silence may not be as
well protected as one would think; rather, it could very easily be lost
and weaponized against the accused for impeachment purposes.49
Almost twenty years later, the Court in Johnson v. United
States 50 began to lay the foundation for the assurances held within the
Miranda warnings. In Johnson, the defendant was charged with
federal tax evasion between 1936 and 1937. 51 After the defendant
chose to take the stand in his own defense at trial, the prosecution
cross-examined the defendant about situations that had occurred in
1938, which were not part of the indictment. 52 Counsel for the
43

Id.
Id.
45
Id. at 496.
46
Id. at 497.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 499 (“The safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those
who do not wish to become witnesses in their own behalf, and not for those who
do.”).
44
Id.
50
318 U.S. 189 (1943).
51
Id. at 190.
52
Id.
44
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defendant objected on the ground of relevance, stating that the
questions presented by the prosecution would cause the defendant to
incriminate himself.53 Defense counsel further argued that “crossexamination should be limited to the subjects opened up by the
examination in chief.”54 The lower court overruled the objection,
finding that the line of questioning presented by the prosecution was
permissible “since it bore directly upon credibility.” 55
Counsel for the defendant tried to assert the privilege against
self-incrimination on behalf of the defendant, but the court objected,
stating that the privilege belonged to “the accused, not his counsel.”56
The court stated that counsel was permitted to inform his client of his
rights and that “it is for [the defendant] to determine whether or not he
wishes to take advantage of them.” 57 Once informed of his right to
remain silent, the defendant declined to answer the incriminating
question, which resulted in the prosecutor making comments to the
jury about the defendant’s “assertion of his constitutional privilege.” 58
The defendant was subsequently convicted and appealed the judgment
of conviction to the Third Circuit. 59 The court affirmed, finding that
the lower court’s allowance of the comment was justified because it
went towards the defendant’s credibility. 60
On review, the Supreme Court agreed that the questions
implicating “incriminating circumstances and events already in
evidence” were appropriate for relevancy purposes.61 However, the
Court found error in allowing the prosecutor to comment on
defendant’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 62 The Court
reasoned that, if a defendant is assured by the court that he may remain
silent when faced with incriminating questions, and comments on his
silence are later permitted, the court would essentially be entrapping
53

Id.
Id. at 191-92.
55
Id. at 192.
56
Id.
57
Id. (The lower court reiterated the holding in Raffel that the privilege against selfincrimination may be waived).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 195.
60
Id.
61
Id. (The Court alluded to the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination
when a defendant takes the stand as his own witness, stating that the defendant “may
not stop short in his testimony by omitting and failing to explain incriminating
circumstances and events already in evidence.”).
62
Id. at 196 (“[T]he requirements of fair trial may preclude any comment.”).
54
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him.63 Here, the Court acknowledged that, if a defendant expressly
invokes and is granted the right to remain silent, the assertion of that
right cannot be used as evidence by the prosecution when submitting
the case to the jury; any such allowance “would be a mockery of
justice.”64
One year before it decided Miranda, the Court ruled in Griffin
v. California65 that the prosecution was barred from using a
defendant’s refusal to testify on his own behalf at trial as substantive
evidence of guilt.66 The California Constitution allowed a defendant’s
failure to take the stand to be used as evidence of his guilt if the
defendant could have been reasonably expected to explain or deny any
adverse evidence or facts. 67 In Griffin, the defendant was charged with
the murder of a woman who was last seen with him before her body
was discovered.68 Griffin challenged the constitutionality of the
California provision, which allowed the prosecution to comment on his
silence at trial, arguing that it violated his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.69 The Court agreed with the defendant and
held that asserting the right to remain silent and refusal to testify at trial
was a right afforded to everyone and could not be used against an
accused as substantive evidence of guilt.70
The Griffin Court stated that there are several reasons why
defendants would choose not to take the stand in their own defense at
trial.71 Should courts allow a defendant’s silence to be commented
upon, the exercise of the privilege would become “a penalty imposed
63

Id. at 197.
Id. at 196-97.
65
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
66
Id. at 615.
67
Id. at 610 (Article I, § 13, of the California Constitution provides in part that “in
any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to
deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be
commented upon by the court and by counsel and may be considered by the court or
the jury.”).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 613.
70
Id.
71
Id. (“Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to
explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against him, will
often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove
prejudices against him. It is not everyone, however, honest, who would therefore
willingly be placed on the witness stand.”) (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 60, 66 (1893)).
64
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by the courts.”72 The Court recognized that it may be natural for a jury,
on its own, to infer guilt from a defendant’s failure to testify, and
commenting upon that failure does not rise to the level of penalty. 73
What is unusual, however, is the inference that the jury may draw when
the court “solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against
him.”74
While the Court addressed silence prior to Miranda, the topic
was only discussed as it related to the use of silence during trial. 75 Prior
to Miranda, a defendant could waive his Fifth Amendment if he took
the stand in his own defense. 76 Once waived, a defendant’s silence
could be used against him, but solely for impeaching his credibility. 77
If a defendant chose to take the stand in his own defense and expressly
invoked his Fifth Amendment privileges, the prosecution would be
barred from using that invocation as substantive evidence of guilt. 78
Likewise, should a defendant refuse to testify at trial, the prosecution
could not use the refusal as substantive evidence of guilt. 79
B.

Miranda v. Arizona

Miranda v. Arizona80 was the result of a consolidation of four
cases;81 however, the Supreme Court decided to focus on the facts of
Ernesto Miranda’s case. 82 Miranda was arrested on March 13, 1963
following the alleged rape of an 18-year-old girl in Arizona.83 Once
arrested, police took Miranda to the station where the victim picked
him out of a lineup. 84 Although he initially denied any involvement,
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614 (“It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly.”).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 615.
76
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 498 (1926).
77
Id.
78
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197 (1943).
79
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
80
384 U.S. 436, 518 (1966).
81
People v. Vignera, 15 N.Y.2d 970 (1965); Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d
684 (9th Cir. 1965); People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571 (1965).
82
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 518.
83
Id. (Court records indicate that at the time of his arrest, Miranda was indigent, had
minimal education and was suffering from severe mental illness, such as
schizophrenia.).
84
Id.
72
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Miranda confessed and signed a sworn statement admitting to and
describing the crime after two hours of interrogation.85 Although the
Court noted that the interrogation served a legitimate purpose, was fair,
and provided little risk of injustice, the Court ultimately held that the
resulting confession was inadmissible. 86
The Court addressed the issue of the “admissibility of
statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 87
The Court was concerned with preserving and safeguarding a
defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to
incriminate himself.88 As a result, new procedural safeguards were
formed to be implemented during the custodial interrogation of any
defendant, which would effectively serve to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination.89 This new rule required that:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 90
The Court defined custodial interrogation to mean “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant
way.”91 Noticeably absent from the Court’s decision was a definition
or standard for determining when an individual is considered to be
taken into “custody,” triggering these hallmark warnings.
C.

A World After Miranda

After Miranda, it became evident that two important factors
surrounding the protections of Miranda warnings were not clear from
85

Id. (The Court noted that this was done without any force, threats or promises.).
Id. at 519.
87
Id. at 445.
88
Id. at 439.
89
Id. at 444.
90
Id.
91
Id. (emphasis added).
86
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the Court’s holding, namely when one is “in custody” and what types
of questions would place a defendant in an “interrogation” for the
purposes of Miranda. As a result, the Court began to distinguish when
pre-trial silence is protected and when it is not, and how the
prosecution’s use of that silence can affect that outcome.
1.

Defining “Custody” and “Interrogation”

Miranda provides protections against arbitrary methods of
questioning while the accused is subject to custodial interrogation, but
it seemingly applies the right to remain silent strictly to when someone
is in “custody.”92 The Court’s holding fell short by not clarifying when
exactly someone is considered to be in “custody,” entitling them to
Miranda warnings. This distinction is an important one, since being
placed into “custody” could be the factor that triggers Fifth
Amendment protections.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court resolved this uncertainty in
1995 in Thompson v. Keohane,93 where it developed a two-part test to
determine whether a person is considered to be held in police custody,
thereby entitling them to be Mirandized.94 In Thompson, the
defendant, Carl Thompson, was charged with first-degree murder for
the murder of his ex-wife.95 Thompson voluntarily appeared for
questioning at police headquarters, where after two hours of
questioning, Thompson confessed to the crime. 96 Thompson was not
read his Miranda rights prior to the interrogation, which resulted in a
confession.97 The issue before the Court on a writ of habeas corpus
was whether Thompson was considered to be in “custody” when the
interrogation took place, thereby requiring the officers to read him his
Miranda rights.98
The Court’s two-part test requires two questions to be
answered to determine whether someone is considered to be in custody
for Miranda purposes:
92

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 103.
96
Id.
97
Id. (Thompson was constantly assured that he was free to leave.).
98
Id. (“Miranda warnings are due only when a suspect interrogated by the police is
‘in custody.’”).
93
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Two discrete inquiries are essential to the
determination: first, what were the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those
circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he
or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave. [T]he court must apply an objective test to
resolve “the ultimate inquiry”: “[was] there a ‘formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.”99
Thus, the holding in Thompson requires an objective analysis,
taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances and
determining whether a reasonable person would have felt that they
were constrained and unable to leave the interrogation.100
Equally left unclear in Miranda were the methods of
questioning that create a formal interrogation, putting the accused in
the proper setting or environment to require law enforcement to read
the suspects their Miranda rights.101 In 1980, the Court in Rhode
Island v. Innis102 finally provided an answer. In Innis, the defendant
was arrested and charged with kidnapping, robbery, and murder. 103
Upon his arrest, the defendant was read his Miranda rights not once,
but four times.104 When the defendant was read his rights by Captain
Leyden the first time, he expressly stated that “he understood those
rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer.” 105 The defendant was
placed in a police patrol car and accompanied by three officers who
were all instructed by their Captain “not to question the respondent or
intimidate or coerce him in any way.”106
Two of the officers began talking amongst themselves about
their concerns for local handicapped children in the area, fearing that
they might stumble upon the unrecovered gun used during the alleged
99

Id. at 112 (emphasis added) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983)).
100
Id.
101
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
102
466 U.S. 291 (1980).
103
Id. at 295.
104
Id. at 294 (The arresting officer placed the defendant under arrest and read him
his Miranda rights. A Sergeant then arrived at the scene and read the defendant his
rights a second time. The captain then arrived and read the defendant his rights for
a third and fourth time.).
105
Id.
106
Id.
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crimes and hurt themselves. 107 The defendant, overhearing the
conversation and also growing concerned for the children’s safety,
urged the officers to turn their patrol car around so that “he could show
them where the gun was located.” 108 The question presented to the
Court on review was whether the conversation between the two
officers amounted to an interrogation. 109
Instead of defining interrogation as strictly involving any
express questioning, the Court was more concerned with the
“interrogation environment.”110 The Court again developed an
objective analysis for determining what constitutes an interrogation for
Miranda purposes, holding that “the term ‘interrogation’ under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.”111 Here, the Court chose to focus on the “perceptions of the
suspect” and what actions the police should have known were
objectively likely to lead to the suspect making incriminating
statements.112 In Innis, interrogation, for the purpose of warranting
Miranda warnings, is defined as “any practice that the police should
know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a
suspect.”113 Thus, under this objective standard, the actions of the
arresting officers would likely trigger the need for the accused to be
Mirandized.
2.

How the Right to Remain Silent is Invoked

The procedural requirements in Miranda protect a defendant’s
right against self-incrimination; however, that right must be expressly
invoked according to the Court in Roberts v. United States. 114 In that
case, Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to the United States
107

Id.
Id.
109
Id. at 298 (The Court chose not to define “interrogation” as narrowly as the
Miranda Court did. The Court cited to the definition of custodial interrogation in
Miranda, stating that “the Miranda rules were to apply only to those police
interrogation practices that involve express questioning of a defendant while in
custody.”)
110
Id. at 299.
111
Id. at 301.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980).
108
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Attorney’s office on suspected drug trafficking charges.115 Payne
suggested that investigators ask Roberts about the activities since she
occasionally lent her car to Roberts. 116 Roberts voluntarily agreed to
answer the investigator’s questions, was read his Miranda rights, and
was advised that he was free to leave at any time. 117 After confessing
to the alleged crimes, Roberts refused to cooperate with the
investigation any further. 118 Roberts appealed his sentence, arguing
that it should not have been based on his refusal to cooperate with the
investigation.119 The Court rejected Roberts’ claim, holding that a
defendant must expressly invoke the privilege against selfincrimination in order to be afforded its protection, reasoning that the
privilege is “not self-executing.”120 Therefore, under Roberts, mere
silence does not invoke one’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.121
3.

Pre-Trial Silence for Impeachment Purposes

In 1976, the Court granted certiorari in Doyle v. Ohio.122 The
defendants in Doyle challenged the constitutionality of the
prosecution’s comment upon their silence after they were arrested and
received Miranda warnings.123 Doyle and Wood were both arrested
and charged with the sale of marijuana. 124 At trial, both defendants
took the stand in their own defense and claimed, for the first time, that
they were framed.125
The prosecutor, on cross-examination,
questioned the defendants as to why they had not told the arresting
officers about this exculpatory information upon their arrest. 126 The
defendants objected to this line of questioning and both objections
were overruled.127
115

Id.
Id. at 553.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 554.
119
Id. at 556.
120
Id. at 559.
121
Id.
122
426 U.S. 610, 616 (1976).
123
Id. at 611.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 613.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 614.
116
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the subsequent convictions,
finding that the use of the defendant’s silence was permissible because
it went to credibility and was not used as substantive evidence of
guilt.128 After the Supreme Court of Ohio denied review, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide whether
impeachment of a defendant’s arrest silence violates any provision of
the Constitution.”129 The State claimed that it was necessary to
question the defendants about their story because the discrepancy and
the time line would give “rise to an inference that the story was
fabricated somewhere along the way.” 130 The Court ultimately
rejected this argument.131
Because the defendants’ silence post-arrest was preceded by
Miranda warnings, the Court explained that such silence “may be
nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights ” and
explained that “post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous.”132 The
Court ultimately held that it would be “fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process” to allow the prosecutor to comment upon
a defendant’s silence post-arrest for impeachment purposes at trial. 133
While the Court held that post-arrest post-Miranda silence could not
be used for impeachment purposes in Doyle, it came to the opposite
conclusion when the case involved pre-arrest pre-Miranda silence in
Jenkins v. Anderson,134 and post-arrest pre-Miranda silence in Fletcher
v. Weir.135
The defendant in Jenkins was charged with first-degree murder
and claimed at his trial, for the first time, that he acted in selfdefense.136 The prosecutor questioned the defendant as to why he had
not told anyone the self-defense story at any point prior to his surrender
to the authorities two-weeks after the killing. 137 The defendant’s prearrest silence was mentioned again during closing arguments in order
to impeach his credibility “by suggesting that he would have spoken
128

Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 618.
133
Id. (The Court held that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment.).
134
447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
135
455 U.S. 603, 607 (1983).
136
Jenkins, 477 U.S. at 231.
137
Id.
129
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out if he had killed in self-defense.”138 The defendant was
subsequently convicted and his constitutional challenge came before
the Supreme Court on writ. 139 Relying on its holding in Raffel,140 the
Court held that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not
violated because he “voluntarily took the witness stand in his own
defense” and was “impeached with his prior silence.” 141 The Court
supported its holding by finding that the fundamental fairness
protection laid out in Doyle was not present because there was “no
governmental action [which] induced petitioner to remain silent before
arrest.”142
Similarly, in Fletcher, the defendant claimed self-defense for
the first time at trial. 143 The prosecution questioned the defendant as
to why he did not offer the exculpatory statement at the time he was
arrested.144 The Court distinguished this case from Doyle because the
record did not “indicate that respondent Weir received any Miranda
warnings during the period in which he remained silent immediately
after his arrest.”145 Since there were no “affirmative assurances”
present which would lead the defendant to believe his silence would
not be used against him, the Court held that there was no violation of
the defendant’s due process rights. 146
It appears that the line the Court draws on the constitutionality
of using silence for impeachment purposes turns on whether a
defendant has been read his Miranda rights. The prosecution is
therefore barred from using any pre-trial silence that follows Miranda
warnings to impeach a defendant’s credibility at trial. Any pre-trial
silence which precedes Miranda warnings and its assurances is fair
game for the prosecution to use against a defendant for impeachment
purposes.147

138

Id.
Id.
140
Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926).
141
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235.
142
Id. at 240 (alteration in original).
143
Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 604.
144
Id. at 604.
145
Id. at 605.
146
Id. at 607.
147
See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240; see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607.
139
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Pre-Trial Silence as Substantive Evidence of
Guilt

This Note focuses on whether allowing the prosecution to use
a defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt in their case-inchief is a constitutional violation. Similarly, the Court has drawn
distinctive lines on when the prosecution is permitted to use pre-trail
silence in its case-in-chief for impeachment purposes.
The Court addressed the use of post-arrest post-Miranda
silence as evidence of the defendant’s sanity in Wainwright v.
Greenfield.148 After the defendant in Wainwright was accused of
sexual battery and arrested, he was read his Miranda rights on three
separate occasions.149 On each occasion, the defendant stated that he
understood these rights and requested that his attorney be present
before making any statements.150 The defendant pleaded “not guilty
by reason of insanity.”151 In its case-in-chief and during closing
arguments, the prosecution presented the testimony of the arresting
officers “and suggested that respondent’s repeated refusal to answer
questions without first consulting an attorney demonstrated a degree
of comprehension that was inconsistent with his claim of insanity.”152
Relying on its reasoning in Doyle, the Court held that there
were implicit assurances “contained in the Miranda warnings ‘that
silence will carry no penalty.’” 153 The fundamental unfairness in
allowing post-arrest post-Miranda silence to be commented upon was
extended to cases where it was used in the prosecution’s case-inchief.154 Once a defendant has been assured that his silence would not
be used against him, it would be a “breach” of that promise and
assurance to allow the prosecution to impermissibly use the
defendant’s silence in its case-in-chief.155
The issue of using pre-arrest pre-Miranda silence as
substantive evidence of guilt was brought before the Court in Salinas
v. Texas.156 The holding in Salinas highlighted the importance of
148

474 U.S. 284, 286 (1986).
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 287.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 290 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976)).
154
Id. at 294.
155
Id. at 285.
156
570 U.S. 178, 179 (2013).
149
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understanding when someone is in police custody. 157 Because the
defendant in Salinas agreed to voluntarily accompany police officers
to the station “and was free to leave at any time,” the Court found that
he was not in “custody” and was therefore not required to be
Mirandized.158
The defendant was cooperative during this
“noncustodial” interview but refused to answer the officer when asked
whether the bullets of his shotgun “would match the shells recovered
at the scene of the murder.” 159 During trial, the prosecutor used the
defendant’s silence during questioning as “evidence of his guilt” and
he was subsequently found guilty.160
Certiorari was granted to address the issue of “whether the
prosecution may use a defendant’s assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination during a noncustodial police interview as part of its
case in chief.”161 However, the Court found it was unnecessary to
address the question “because the petitioner did not invoke the
privilege during his interview.”162 This was the Court’s chance to
resolve the circuit split, but the majority believed that addressing that
question was unnecessary because the case could be decided on
different grounds.163 The holding incorporated the rule in Roberts,
which requires a defendant to expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent.164 The exception to this rule, of course, is where
the defendant is faced with an “unwarned custodial interrogation.” 165
The Court reasoned that, because the defendant voluntarily
accompanied police to the station and was free to leave at any time, he
was not in “custody.”166 Because he did not meet the exception laid
out in Miranda, he was required to expressly invoke his Fifth
Amendment protections. 167 As a result, the Court found that the
prosecution’s use of the defendant’s noncustodial silence did not
violate his Fifth Amendment rights. 168 Had the defendant been placed
157

Id. at 185.
Id.
159
Id. at 182.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 183.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980).
165
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
166
Id.
167
Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 185 (2013).
168
Id.
158
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into “custody” prior to questioning, he would not have been required
to affirmatively invoke his right to remain silent.
IV.

THE WRONG SIDE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts have all
taken the position that the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s postarrest pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt does not
violate Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.169
The basis for each circuit court’s opinion is uniform: receipt of
Miranda warnings is the determinative factor for whether pre-trial
silence is protected. 170 Absent the assurances that officers are required
to read when arresting a suspect, that the accused has the right to
remain silent, these courts have found that the use of post-arrest preMiranda statements is admissible to prove a defendant’s guilt. 171
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the issue in United States v.
Love,172 holding that in the absence of Miranda warnings, there was
no error in allowing testimony concerning the defendant’s pre-trial
silence as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 173 In Love, three
defendants were charged and convicted of a number of different drug
related offenses, as well as violation of the federal racketeering statute
(“RICO”), among other federal offenses. 174 The defendants presented
a number of grounds for reversing their convictions, but the only one
this Note is concerned with is the demand for a mistrial after the
arresting officer was allowed to testify to the silence of two defendants
the night they were arrested. 175 The Fourth Circuit relied on the
Court’s holding in Fletcher, where the prosecution was permitted to
present testimony concerning a defendant’s silence “where the
defendant has not received any Miranda warnings during the period in
169

United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Garcia-Gil, 133 F. App'x 102, 108 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Fraizer, 394 F.3d
612, 619 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11th Cir.
1991).
170
Meaghan Elizabeth Ryan, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: The
Substantive Use of Pre-Miranda Silence, 58 ALA. L. REV. 903, 908 (2007).
171
Love, 767 F.2d at 1063; Garcia-Gil, 133 F. App'x at 108; Fraizer, 394 F.3d at
619; Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1570.
172
Love, 767 F.2d at 1063.
173
Id. at 1063.
174
Id. at 1054.
175
Id. at 1063.
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which he remained silent immediately after his arrest.”176 Although
the holding in Fletcher applied exclusively to the use of pre-trial
silence for impeachment purposes, the Fourth Circuit found that the
Court’s reasoning was appropriate since none of the defendants in Love
had been given any Miranda warnings.177 The Fourth Circuit court did
not discuss whether the defendants in Love should have received
Miranda warnings following their formal arrest.
The Eleventh Circuit soon followed in 1991 when it decided
United States v. Rivera. 178 Defendants in Rivera were convicted of
conspiracy to import, importation of, conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute in excess of 500
grams of cocaine.179 They subsequently appealed their convictions,
requesting a mistrial on the ground that the government violated their
Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on their silence at trial “after
having been arrested and given warnings as required by Miranda v.
Arizona.”180 The defendants were traveling to Miami from Colombia
when they were stopped by United States Customs agents, who
accused them of smugglings drugs into the country.181 After
conducting a quick search in the inspection area, the agent found
cocaine in one of the defendant’s luggage, which had been altered to
include a false bottom.182 The agent testified “that the group showed
no surprise, agitation or protest while he was probing Stroud’s
luggage.”183 After placing the three suspects into separate rooms so
their luggage could be inspected, the agent noticed all of the suitcases
were identical to the one that contained a false bottom, where he
subsequently founded cocaine. 184 Upon such examination, the agent
informed all three suspects that they were under arrest and read them
their Miranda rights.185
176

Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1983).
Love, 767 F.2d at 1063; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607.
178
944 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
179
Id. at 1565.
180
Id. at 1566 (One of the three defendants initially charged had pleaded guilty prior
to trial.).
181
Id.
182
Id. (This case involved three defendants: Elena Vila, Johnny Rivera, and John
Stroud. Stroud’s suitcase contained the cocaine discovered during the initial
inspection.).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 1566.
185
Id.
177
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The arresting agent testified as to the defendants’ demeanors as
he observed them at three different points, the first of which was the
initial confrontation and the subsequent searches.186 While the court
found that any comment on the defendants’ demeanors which was
observed after they were read their Miranda rights was impermissible,
any testimony as to their demeanors before such rights were read was
not improper.187 The court relied on the holding in Fletcher, finding
that “the government may comment on a defendant’s silence when it
occurs after arrest, but before Miranda warnings are given,” again
ignoring that the holding in Fletcher applied only to the use of silence
for impeachment purposes.188
The Fifth Circuit joined the split in 2005 with its decision in
the case of United States v. Garcia-Gil.189 The defendant in Garcia
was convicted of conspiracy and possession with the intent to
distribute more than twenty kilograms of cocaine after being stopped
by Border Patrol Agents.190 After searching his car, the agents told
Garcia he was under arrest, at which time Garcia turned around, put
his hands behind his back, and remained silent. 191 During Garcia's
trial, despite the fact that the agents handcuffed him and read him his
Miranda rights, the period of silence between when he put his hands
behind his back and when he was handcuffed was presented as
evidence.192 The arresting agents both testified that Garcia did nothing
more than put his head down and place his hands behind his back. 193
Garcia argued that the government’s use of this brief period of silence
seconds before being read his Miranda rights was a violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights.194 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating that
“[u]se at trial of pre-Miranda silence is not necessarily
unconstitutional.195 Garcia argued that post-arrest pre-Miranda silence
186

Id. at 1567.
Id. at 1568.
188
Id. (citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982)).
189
133 Fed. App’x 102 (5th Cir. 2005) (The Fifth Circuit also decided Salinas v.
Texas in 2007 which made its way up to the Supreme Court, but the issue of postarrest pre-Miranda silence was not addressed by the Court, which decided the case
on other grounds, namely the express invocation requirement.). See Salinas v. Texas,
570 U.S. 178 (2013).
190
Id. at 104.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 107.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
187
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may only be used at trial for impeachment purposes; however, the Fifth
Circuit had already decided the issue and provided precedent to
support its ultimate decision to find no error in allowing the preMiranda silence.196
The Eighth Circuit joined its sister circuits the same year with
its decision in United States v. Fraizer.197 The defendant in Fraizer
was charged and convicted on drug related charges. 198 The defendant
appealed his conviction on several grounds, which focused on the
government’s use of post-arrest pre-Miranda silence as a violation of
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.199 The Eighth
Circuit noted the Court’s lack of guidance on this issue, stating that
“[t]he use of silence in criminal cases has been addressed by the Court
under almost all but the instant circumstances.” 200 Similar to the
agents in Garcia,201 here the arresting officer testified to the
defendant’s silence during and right after his arrest, which the
government noted as “one factor that could be indicative of guilt.” 202
The Eighth Circuit relied on the Court’s ruling in Fletcher, holding that
Fraizer was under no government-imposed compulsion to speak (i.e.
interrogation) which would induce a defendant to remain silent. 203
Because Fraizer was under no compulsion to speak at the time of his
arrest, his choice to remain silent was irrelevant and thus, the court
found that the admission of testimony as to his silence as substantive
proof of his guilt did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.204
V.

THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals have
all held that the government’s use of post-arrest pre-Miranda silence

196

Id (citing United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996)).
394 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 2005).
198
Id. at 614.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 618 (The Eighth Circuit went on to cite the holdings in Doyle (Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)), as well as Wainwright (Wainwright v. Greenfield,
474 U.S. 284, 286 (1986)). The court also noted the circuit split.).
201
United States v. Garcia-Gil, 133 Fed. App’x 102, 107 (5th Cir. 2005)
202
Id. at 618.
203
Id. at 620 (citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1983).
204
Id.
197
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as substantive evidence of a defendant’s guilt violates the Fifth
Amendment.205
The Seventh Circuit ruled on the issue in United States v.
Hernandez,206 though it nevertheless found the error in allowing
testimony regarding the defendant’s silence to be harmless. 207 The
defendant in Hernandez was charged with conspiracy to possess and
distribute cocaine after he was arrested following an encounter with an
undercover agent.208 The issue of the evidentiary use of the
defendant’s silence arose when the prosecutor asked the arresting
officer whether the defendant had said anything in response to being
told he was under arrest. 209 Defense counsel objected and addressed
the issue of the pre-Miranda silence as well as statements made postMiranda.210 However, defense counsel did not pursue the preMiranda issue and the judge sustained the objection, which was
limited only to any post-Miranda statements.211 Although the
prosecutor was told twice to “go into another area,” the judge allowed
the prosecutor to repeat the question to the jury, to which the arresting
officer answered “No.”212 While the defendant objected and moved
for a mistrial, the judge denied the motion and directed the prosecutor
to move on, thereby allowing the silence to be admitted into
evidence.213
Upon review, the Seventh Circuit began its discussion of the
use of post-arrest silence by quoting precedent, where it previously
held that “it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to allow a prosecutor to use as evidence of guilt a
defendant’s refusal to talk to police.”214 The court found that the
prosecutor deliberately intended to elicit direct reference to the
defendant’s silence when the witness was asked to recount the
205

United States v. Veldarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hernandez,
948 F.2d 316, 324 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
206
948 F.2d 316, 324 (7th Cir. 1997).
207
Id. at 324.
208
Id. at 317.
209
Id. at 322.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. (The question asked by the prosecutor was whether the defendant had said
anything in response after being told he was under arrest.).
213
Id.
214
Id. (quoting United States v. Ramos, 932 F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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defendant’s response to police confrontation. 215 The court held that
the lower court erroneously allowed the mention of the defendant’s
silence to be brought into evidence, but that the error was “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”216 Since the mention of the defendant’s
silence was only momentary and mentioned while discussing
admissibility of other matters, when viewed in the context of the entire
record, “the single reference to [the defendant’s] silence was minor,
and…its admission had no impact on the jury.”217 While the court
ultimately held that the error was harmless, it was an error,
nonetheless.218
The Ninth Circuit held that the prosecution’s use of silence as
evidence of guilt was prohibited and a violation of the Fifth
Amendment in United States v. Whitehead.219 The defendant in
Whitehead was stopped and questioned by Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) officers as he attempted to enter
California from the Mexico border. 220
Whitehead’s nervous
appearance and the suspicious appearance of the vehicle he was
driving prompted INS officers to pull Whitehead into a secondary
inspection lot, where a narcotics-detector dog screened Whitehead’s
car “and alerted to the rear of the vehicle,” where a substantial amount
of marijuana was recovered. 221 Whitehead and his brother, who was
in the passenger’s seat, were both placed into custody, but not yet read
their Miranda rights.222 While in custody, and when later placed into
separate holding cells, Whitehead continued to remain silent. 223 At
215

Id. at 324.
Id. (The Court considered three factors in determining that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming and
the “impact of the objectionable material was negligible.” These factors include (1)
the brevity of the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s silence, (2) the weight
of the silence compared to the entire record, and (3) the fact that most of the
references to silence were made during the witness’s testimony to show not that the
defendant was silent, but that he told inconsistent stories.) (citing Fencl v.
Abrahamson, 841 F.2d 760, 769 (7th Cir. 1988)).
217
Id. at 325.
218
Id.
219
200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2000).
220
Id. at 636.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 637 (The Court noted that it was “undisputed that after he was taken into
custody for the purposes of Miranda, but before he was read the Miranda warnings,
Whitehead exercised his right to remain silent.”).
216
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trial, the prosecutor asked the arresting officer several leading
questions, soliciting responses that indicated that Whitehead had
remained silent throughout the entire incident leading to his arrest.224
During closing arguments “the prosecutor argued to the jury that
Whitehead remained silent because he knew he was guilty.” 225
The court reviewed the claim under the plain-error standard
and ultimately ruled that while “the district court committed ‘error’
that is ‘plain’, we cannot conclude that the error affected Whitehead’s
substantial rights.”226 Similar to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in
Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit held that the Whitehead’s privilege
against self-incrimination was infringed upon, but that this error did
not affect the outcome of the proceeding because of the
“overwhelming physical evidence of Whitehead’s guilt.” 227 The court
nonetheless joined the circuit split by ruling that the prosecutor’s use
of the defendant’s post-arrest pre-Miranda silence was improper and
an infringement of his Fifth Amendment rights.228
The Ninth Circuit heard United States v. Velarde-Gomez
(Velarde) a year later, a case similar to Whitehead.229 The court relied
on its precedent in Whitehead, finding that the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment protections against self-incrimination in Velarde were
violated.230 Like the defendant in Whitehead, Velarde was arrested
while attempting to transport marijuana into the United States from
Mexico, placed into custody, remained silent while in custody, and had
an adverse inference drawn from his silence by the jury. 231 The
government tried to argue that Velarde could be distinguished from
224

Id.
Id. at 638 (The court found that there was “no question that an inference of guilt
from silence was stressed to the jury in violation of Whitehead’s constitutional
rights.”).
226
Id. (The court reviewed Whitehead’s claim for plain error because he did not
property object in the district court. Nor did he “preserve his objection to the use of
his silence through his pretrial motion in limine to suppress statements.” Under the
plain-error standard, there must be an “error,” that is “plain,” which ultimately affects
substantial rights. If all three of these requirements are met, a court may exercise its
discretion to “notice of forfeited error,” but only if that error “seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”) (quoting Johnson
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1977)).
227
Id. at 639.
228
Id.
229
269 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
230
Id. at 1029. See United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2000).
231
Velarde, 269 F.3d at 1029. See Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 639.
225
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Whitehead because the government had commented on Velarde’s
“demeanor” – not his silence.232
Velarde attempted to enter California from Mexico when he
was stopped at a primary inspection site. 233 Velarde told Customs
Agent Rodriguez that he had just purchased the 1983 Grand Marquis
he was driving twenty days earlier and had gone to Mexico “to do some
drinking.”234 The title to the automobile remained in the prior owner’s
name, which caused Agent Rodriguez to become suspicious about the
car’s ownership, leading him to ask Velarde to proceed to a secondary
inspection site.235 There, the detection dog alerted Customs officials
to the gas tank of the vehicle, where sixty-three pounds of marijuana
were found.236 Velarde was brought into an interview room where he
was informed that the agents had found the marijuana in his gas tank. 237
However, “Velarde did not speak or physically respond." 238 Agent
Salazar eventually read Velarde his Miranda rights, which Velarde
subsequently waived, subjecting himself to questioning.239
Velarde filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his
silence and demeanor, which the district court initially granted. 240
However, after the prosecution asked for clarification of the court’s
ruling regarding the inadmissibility of Velarde’s post-arrest silence
and demeanor, the district court reconsidered its previous ruling and
allowed the government to introduce all of its “evidence of ‘demeanor’
both before and after Velarde waived his Miranda rights.”241 The
government elicited Agent Salazar’s testimony, over the defense’s
objection, as to Velarde’s non-responsiveness during the initial
interview after the marijuana was first discovered. 242 The prosecutor
addressed the jury, stating that Velarde was the “perfect guy” for the
job as a drug courier because he was “totally relaxed” and “showed no
emotion.”243 While the government may have tried to distinguish
232

Velarde, 269 F.3d at 1030.
Id. at 1026.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 1026-27.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 1028.
233
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“demeanor” evidence from silence, the circuit court rejected this
argument.244 Relying on precedent, the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court erred in admitting any statements regarding such
silence.245
The D.C. Circuit became the third federal court of appeals to
hold that it is impermissible for the prosecutor to use post-arrest, preMiranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt, and doing so would
violate a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.246 In United States v. Moore,247 the defendant was
arrested on drug possession and weapons charges following a traffic
stop.248 The defendant appealed his conviction, citing multiple errors,
most importantly prosecutorial misconduct following comments on his
post-arrest silence by the prosecution. 249 During direct examination,
the prosecutor asked the arresting officer if the defendants said
anything when the illegal weapons were found in his car, to which
defense counsel did not object.250 The prosecutor commented upon the
defendant’s silence again during closing arguments, prompting
counsel for the defense to object stating that the prosecutor was
“improperly commenting upon post-arrest silence.”251
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit was clear that custody, not
interrogation, is the “triggering mechanism for the right of pretrial
silence under Miranda.”252 The court reasoned that to hold differently
would provide arresting officers with the incentive to delay
interrogations in order to create “an intervening ‘silence’ that could
then be used against the defendant.” 253 Most importantly, the court
pointed out the misconception which the circuit courts on the wrong
244

Id.
Id. (The Circuit court held that the government’s evidence of a lack of physical
or emotional reaction was “tantamount” to evidence of silence and any admission of
this evidence was a violation of Velarde’s Fifth Amendment rights. The court
distinguished “demeanor” evidence as involving an action or a physical response
from silence, which is a mere non-reaction or a failure to speak.).
246
104 F.3d 377, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Marty Skrapka, Silence Should Be Golden:
A Case Against the Use of a Defendant's Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence as
Evidence of Guilt, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 382 (2006).
247
104 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
248
Id. at 380.
249
Id. at 384.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id. at 385.
253
Id.
245
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side of the split so heavily rely on; that it in no way cannot be the case
that the right against self-incrimination should only attach when
officers recite Miranda warnings.254 The court noted that, “to hold …
that the failure to give those same warnings permits the state to use a
defendant’s silence against him turns a whole realm of constitutional
protection on its head.”255 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit held that “the
silence of an arrested defendant, under Griffin, is an exercise of his
Fifth Amendment rights which the Government cannot use to his
prejudice.”256 In comparison to its sister circuits, the D.C. Circuit
provides the strongest and the most substantive reasoning against using
post-arrest pre-Miranda silence against defendants as evidence of their
guilt.
VI.

ARGUMENT

Since Miranda, criminal defendants have been afforded the
right to remain silent to avoid making any incriminating statements
during a pre-trial police interrogation. 257 The lack of clarity on when
a criminal defendant has been placed into custody has resulted in a
never-ending circuit split that must be resolved. The invocation of a
defendant’s right to remain silent, whether expressly read or not,
should not be used against him once he is placed into police custody.
To do so would place a defendant in an impossible situation where the
choice to remain silent or speak up will land him in the same position
– guilty. The Supreme Court has drawn upon a similar line of
reasoning under the circumstances in Johnson, yet the need for
uniformity on the constitutionality of the prosecution’s use of postarrest pre-Miranda silence persists.258 The Court has the ability to
resolve the split by setting a uniform rule, which would set arrest as
the determinative factor for when a defendant is considered to be in
custody, thereby triggering the right to remain silent and the assurances
included in the reading of Miranda rights.
254

Id. at 386.
Id.
256
Id. at 387.
257
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
258
Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197 (1943) (In Johnson, the Supreme
Court held that a criminal defendant would be “entrapped” if he was guaranteed the
right to remain silent and it was later used against him. The Court, however,
emphasized that cases where the defendant expressly invokes his right to remain
silent are distinguished from those where the defendant does not.).
255
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While the Court has addressed post-arrest post-Miranda silence
in Wainwright, and pre-arrest pre-Miranda silence in Salinas, postarrest pre-Miranda silence has yet to be addressed. The need for a
resolution of this gray area is evident. The Court was clear in Salinas
that custody is the triggering mechanism which requires law
enforcement to read a suspect the rights afforded to him as laid out in
Miranda.259 How could there ever be a time where a suspect is placed
under arrest, in police custody, but has not yet been read his Miranda
rights, leaving him open to attack if he chooses to remain silent in the
face of interrogation? The problem lies in the lack of clarity as to when
a defendant is in “custody” for the purposes of Miranda and a lack of
consistency among lower courts when deciding to use formal arrest as
the triggering factor.
All the cases which came out on the “wrong” side of the circuit
split show uniformity in their reasoning for allowing the prosecution
to use a defendant’s post-arrest pre-Miranda silence in their case-inchief. One common pattern is the reliance on the Court’s holding in
Fletcher.260 Although each case notes that the holding in Fletcher
applied to the use of pre-trial silence for impeachment purposes, they
nonetheless extended Fletcher’s holding to allow for the use of pretrial silence as substantive evidence of guilt simply because no
Miranda warnings were given. Thus, this side of the split relies
heavily on the absence of Miranda warnings to justify the damaging
effect of allowing a defendant’s pre-trial silence to be used against
them in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.261 Such an unsubstantiated
“justification” can lead to unfair prejudice against defendants,
substantially affecting their due process rights. The error in the
decisions of the circuit courts on the “wrong” side of the split is not in
the courts’ focus on whether Miranda warnings were read, but a lack
of inquiry into why they were not. In all the cases where the defendants
were placed under arrest, they should have been considered “in
custody” and read their Miranda rights according to the Court’s
opinion in Thompson.262
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is one of
those fundamental hallmarks that every United States citizen should be
aware of. If a suspect is arrested, he should automatically be
259

Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 185 (2013).
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1983).
261
See supra Part III.
262
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
260
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considered “in custody” and should be read his Miranda rights. The
Court established a bright line rule in Thompson for determining
whether a suspect is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. As
previously discussed, the inquiry is whether a formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement exists to the degree associated with a formal
arrest.263 Yet, the use of post-arrest silence as substantive evidence of
guilt is an issue that continues to cloud our justice system.
It should be an extreme cause of concern that the topic of postarrest pre-Miranda silence is one that has still gone unresolved. One
of the basic and fundamental holdings in Miranda is that an
individual’s privilege against self-incrimination becomes jeopardized
the minute he is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by authorities in any significant way. 264 Applying the
objective test provided by the Court in Thompson,265 it would be
reasonable for any person in the defendant’s shoes to think that he
would be restricted from freedom of movement as soon as he is placed
in handcuffs. Thus, it should be equally reasonable that most people
who are generally aware of their right to remain silent would choose
to do so once they are placed under arrest. It seems easy enough for
one to come to this conclusion, yet the Court’s decision to ignore this
gray area continues to jeopardize an individual’s privileges against
self-incrimination.
Therefore, if a suspect is arrested and chooses to remain silent
because he is aware of the implicit assurance that his silene will carry
no penalty, and he happens to be in a state which falls within the
jurisdiction of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts,
he cannot rely on that implicit assurance absent being read his Miranda
rights.266
VII.

CONCLUSION

Silence is indeed inherently ambiguous in most circumstances,
as Justice Marshall said. 267 Using a defendant’s post-arrest silence as
substantive evidence of his guilt is highly problematic and poses a
substantial threat to one of the most fundamental rights afforded to
263

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
265
Thomson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
266
See supra Part III.
267
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975).
264

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/12

32

Hirakis: Post-Arrest Pre-Miranda Silence

2022

POST-ARREST PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE

355

individuals. Should the issue of post-arrest pre-Miranda silence ever
present itself again, which seems likely given the current circuit split
still impeding our justice system, the Supreme Court should take the
opportunity to recognize and settle the dispute by getting back to the
basics and making it clear that there should never be any post-arrest
instances where an individual is not apprised of the procedural
safeguards that are so deeply rooted in our justice system.
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